Computer Ethics Deborah Johnson Pdf Download

We examine, what has been considered a defining characteristic of computer ethics, namely the claim that it is unique and argue that there is a significant conceptual muddle about the statement, "Computer ethics is unique." This muddle has led to multiple inconsistent views of computer ethics and in fact this muddle has contributed to some claims which are counter productive for the discipline. In this paper we clarify the claim and show why these counter productive claims are mistaken.

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Computer Ethics: The Evolution of the Uniqueness Revolution

by Donald Gotterbarn and Simon Rogerson

Presented at the ACM Computer Ethics Conference CEPE'97, Erasmus University, The Netherlands, 1997

Abstract:

We examine, what has been considered a defining characteristic of computer ethics, namely the claim that it is

unique and argue that there is a significant conceptual muddle about the statement, "Computer ethics is

unique." This muddle has led to multiple inconsistent views of computer ethics and in fact this muddle has

contributed to some claims which are counter productive for the discipline. In this paper we clarify the claim

and show why these counter productive claims are mistaken.

Contact: CCSR Web Master Last update Fri Feb 27 1998

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Computer Ethics: The Evolution of the Uniqueness Revolution http://www.ccsr.cse.dmu.ac.uk/resources/general/discipline/cepe97.html

Computer Ethics: The Evolution of the Uniqueness Revolution

by Donald Gotterbarn and Simon Rogerson

Abstract: We examine, what has been considered a defining characteristic of computer ethics, namely the

claim that it is unique and argue that there is a significant conceptual muddle about the statement, "Computer

ethics is unique." This muddle has led to multiple views of computer ethics which appear to be inconsistent

and in fact this muddle has contributed to some claims which are counter productive for the discipline. In this

paper we clarify the the different senses of this claim and show why these counter productive senses are

mistaken.

1 Introduction

In the evolution of computer ethics there has been an intermittent discussion of the statement that "Computer

ethics is unique". The discussion seems to re-emerge with each new change in technology and change in

predominant area of interest about the way computers are changing our social institutions. One of the earliest

positive definitions of computer ethics was given by James Moor [1985]. In this paper Moor argues that

computer ethics is unique by first defining a computer ethics situation as one in which a computer is "essentially

involved". This involvement contributes to the uniqueness of the situation because of the computer's unique

properties of "logical malleability" and "speed". He argues that the pervasive alteration of social and cultural

situations by this machine has created policy "vacuums" about how to use computer technology which require

us to adopt a multi-disciplinary approach to determine how to fill these vacuums. From this he concludes that

the domain of computer ethics consists of those situations which have been altered and that computer ethics is

worthy of study because of its practical importance. The rise of the Internet has led to several new papers on

the question. Deborah Johnson[1997] recently suggested that several aspects of the Internet have had an

impact on the issues within computer ethics She appeals to the pervasive "anonymity" of individuals and

"reproducibility" of information in ways not possible without the Internet. Krystyna Gorniak [1996] also

appeals to the Internet and argues that there are no good analogies available for cyber-situations.

On the surface it may appear that these authors are making similar claims based on the deceptively simple

claim "Computer ethics is unique" (Hereafter CEIU). We shall see that there are many meanings to CEIU.

There are several axis of understanding of CEIU. One way to see the difference is to look at the position that

CEIU is used to further. In the papers cited above the authors assume that one approach to ethical reasoning

is by analogy. We determine which normative principles to apply and how to judge a new situation based on

its similarity to other familiar situations. Moor points to a policy vacuum where we have not yet discovered the

analogies to the new situations, while Gorniak talks about the absence of analogies for cyber-situations. From

this she concludes traditional ethics, for which we have analogies, which may be difficult to discover, does not

apply to cyber-situations. Moor's claim for uniqueness leads to a search for usable analogies; Johnson uses

traditional norms to derive some general rules for behavior; while Gorniak's claim about cyber-situations

means that traditional ethics is not applicable to cyber-situations. This is an example of one difference in

CEIU, namely some interpret CEIU to mean "Computers have made an evolutionary change in the ethical

landscape and we have to work hard using traditional ethics to remap that landscape", while others interpret

CEIU to mean that "Computers have made a revolutionary change in the ethical landscape such that the

principles space and time can no longer be used to guide us in traversing the landscape." The evolutionary

version of CEIU is about particular ethical decisions, while the revolutionary version is about the methodology

of ethical reasoning.

This is but one of several variations in CEIU. In this paper, we maintain that:

this is not a simple statement, but that it has several quite distinct meanings,

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this assertion has some significant and dangerous consequences,

until these meanings of uniqueness are clearly defined, discussions based on CEIU results in

inconsistencies and a failure to understand the consequences of this claim, and

the revolutionary interpretation of CEIU has not yet been proven.

2 CEIU: traditional responses

2.1 The assertion of CEIU is benign

Discussions about the uniqueness of computer ethics is sometimes viewed by philosophers and novice

computer ethics scholars as just another benign philosophical discussion. The answer to this question is

viewed as simply a part of the definition of computer ethics. Saying computer ethics is unique is almost like

giving an ostensive definition.

People who have dealt with this question have rarely claimed to be establishing results in the discipline of

computer ethics. CEIU's primary use is as a justification for the discipline of computer ethics or the study of

these special unique problems. The uniqueness discussion is sometimes viewed as so irrelevant to the progress

of the discipline, that the discussants show little interest in how others have approached the question or in

testing the correctness or precise meaning of other's claims that computer ethics is unique. This claim is

sometimes made to justify the creation of another discipline or academic department, for example, Walter

Maner [1995] states, " Computer ethics is unique so its study is justified." As indicated above, the

consequences of such a claim, when understood in a revolutionary way, are far from insignificant.

2.2 A framework for understanding

A framework for understanding the various meanings of this assertion will be useful. One way to view the brief

history of computer ethics is to order the primary areas of interest of computer ethics. Broadly speaking

computer ethicists have addressed subjects of: 1) abuses committed with computers including fraud and theft,

2) the effects computers have on changing society, and 3) ethical issues related to the development of

software systems. In the first stage of concern with computer ethics the order of the interests was: abuses,

changes to society, and development issues. In the current stage of computer ethics the order of these areas is

changed to society characterized by the Internet, abuses done using computers, and software development

issues.

Donn Parker was one of the early writers about ethical issues in computing. In his early works Parker used

the fact that each answer to short scenarios was unique and that this disagreement proved that the reason

computer ethics is not taught in computer science departments is that there is no such subject as computer

ethics. It is so unique, it is a non-discipline [Parker 1977]. He used a voting methodology to decide what is

ethical in computing. He gathered the opinions of people from several professions, ranging from accountants,

attorneys, psychologists and philosophy professors to computer professionals. They were asked to vote on

the ethics of individuals described in very short scenarios. He says, this work was not guided by a concept of

computer ethics nor was there an attempt to discover ethical principles. He called this approach

"micro-ethics." Not only was there an absence of a concept of computer ethics but the primary direction was

an emphasis on proscribed activities. The only direction was that the scenarios were " written in such a way as

to raise questions of unethicality rather than ethicality [Parker 1977]". Donn Parker used the diversity of

opinions expressed about these scenarios to argue that there was no such thing as computer ethics.

Parker's extreme conclusion is not justified for two reasons. First, it does not follow from his own evidence.

Second, the evidence examined has little to do with Computer Ethics. The presumption that there can be no

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agreement in ethics can be so strong that it corrupts one's view of the evidence. For example, at a conference,

Parker described the results of his 1977 workshop. He began by saying that there was agreement on many

scenarios and then went on to say, "We got a lot of very close votes. In other words, we were not able to

obtain a consensus on what is unethical and not unethical in the computer field. [Parker 1982]" This

conclusion requires that he ignores all the places where there was agreement. It does not follow from the

existence of some gray areas in a domain that there are no clear areas in a domain. The existence of hard

problems in math - like the discrete decimal value of 1/3 - is not proof that there are no solutions in math. He

handles the evidence in the same way in his revision of the 1977 book [Parker 1990]. The only cases he

brings forward to the new book are those which generated the highest degree of diversity of opinion. He

ignored those on which there had been a significant degree of unanimity.

In the first stage of the concern with computer ethics, James Moor had argued that computer ethics is a viable

subject but that the pervasive impact of computing had caused some policy vacuums about the practical use

of computers. For Moor, uniqueness refers to the new situations More recently Krystyna Gorniak, arguing

that Moor has not gone far enough [Gorniak 1996] maintains that although there may be an area called

computer ethics, it is so unique that traditional ethical concepts do not apply to it and we have to wait for the

Newtonian revolution in ethics to develop or discover the concepts that do apply. The computer has unique

effects on the world "...the more computers will change the world as we know it, the more irrelevant ethical

rules will be and the more evident the need of a new ethic. This new ethic will be the computer ethic." The

uniqueness of the way the computer transforms the world will "...require us to go back to the old question:

what is ethical". The old ethics has been made irrelevant by the unique nature of the computer revolution.

According to Gorniak, we are in an ethical "vacuum" in which the prior ethics (Utilitarianism, Kantianism, etc.)

are increasingly irrelevant.. Some computer practitioners may appreciate this, since no one can, with good

philosophical foundation, say their actions are ethically wrong. Others consider this an ambiguous and

ill-founded situation which restricts all of their actions because they want to only do the right thing. Notice how

"uniqueness" has shifted from referring to a socio-cultural phenomena and it now refers to the principles of

normative ethics, which are so unique they are yet to be discovered.

The answer to the uniqueness question is not insignificant. What is puzzling is that, as we have just seen, the

same answer "Yes, computer ethics is unique." can lead to such radically different conclusions about the

viability and nature of the subject "computer ethics". There are even those (for example Oz) who have used all

the uniqueness variants to promote an inclusive form of computer ethics. How can there be such diverse

conclusions drawn from such a simple statement? William James, the great American philosopher, said that

many philosophical problems can be solved if we clearly define the question .

3 The Variety of Answers

The variety of interpretations of the uniqueness claim can be approached from several directions. We present

the views of several authorities in compute ethics. We consider their starting positions, the resultant

perspectives that they adopt and use these to identify the overall view of computer ethics each of them

promotes.

In 1985, Deborah Johnson considered computer ethics to be a study into the way in which computers pose

new versions of standard moral problems and moral dilemmas that resulted in having to apply moral norms in

new situations. Her stance allows little room for the concept of computer ethics uniqueness. This stance is

modified in the second edition of her book [1994] in that more emphasis is put on computer ethics being

concerned with new species of problems. This evolution of stance continues in her work with Keith Miller

[1996].

Johnson and Miller explain that computing has fundamentally changed who we are as individuals, communities

and nations and that computing has challenged and modified social culture, laws, economics and politics. They

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explain that computer ethics is about working on something new whilst drawing on something old. Significantly

they state that most computing issues can be understood using traditional moral concepts but there are special

features that make a moral difference. The implication is that if most are covered, have analogies with standard

ethical issues, some must not be covered and these therefore are unique. They also recognize that the issues

are significant in their own right and are thus arguing for the existence of a type of uniqueness. In addition to

the way computers transform some social issues, they explain that issues arise in unique ways that computer

professionals must address in the course of their work. It is clear that the genus-species argument has thus

evolved to recognize there is a kind of uniqueness in computer ethics and that there is some recognition it is

multifaceted.

Moor[1985] advocates that the field is concerned with policy vacuums and conceptual muddles regarding the

social and ethical use of computing. Moor appears to be suggesting that there is the possibility of new situations

but does not advocate abandoning existing theories to address these new situations which is the possible

course of action that Gorniak [1996] proposes. Moor also implies that addressing these issues will require an

amalgam of disciplines.

Oz [1994] claims that it is the speed of change which has left a big ethical vacuum and this has meant it is

difficult to address issues of misuse that inevitably follow the advent of this universal tool [Moor 1985]. Oz

describes three categories of misuse requiring ethical consideration:offences that existed before the advent of

computers but were facilitated by computers, offences against computers, computer equipment and software,

and the invasion of privacy. The first of these is the genus-species concept, the second includes offences that

did not exist before the advent of computers such as the destruction of computer files and the illegal copying of

software, and the final one is a specific fundamental human right. Oz is unique in that all of the varieties of the

uniqueness claim are maintained simultaneously.

Maner [1990] started to define an area of study that could be labelled computer ethics. In a later paper,

Maner [1996] advocates that computer ethics examines the ethical problems aggravated , transformed or

created by computing and that the "Lack of an effective analogy forces us to discover new moral values,

formulate new moral principles, develop new policies, and find new ways to think ...". Maner makes a clear

statement of uniqueness in the definition of computer ethics.

Bynum [1993] advocates that computer ethics is concerned with how to integrate computing and human values

in such a way that computing advances and protects human values rather than harms them. It is probably the

broadest perspective and embraces applied ethics, sociology of computing, technology assessment, computer

law and other related fields. Such an approach appears to place computer ethics as an "umbrella" discipline

unique in its holistic form but not when decomposed.

Huff and Finholt[1994] adopt a different stance. They focus on the computer professional, suggesting there are

three areas of commitment in the search for excellence: commitment to designing and implementing a quality

product, awareness of ethical issues in design and implementation, and concern about the social context that

influences the use of computing. This appears to be an approach of practical usefulness recognizing that the

field requires some special attention given its special characteristics. This approach is similar to the work of

Gotterbarn [1992] in this area who is concerned with the way in which computer professionals undertake their

work so that the outcomes of their endeavors are socially and ethically acceptable.

Anderson [1994] suggests that computer ethics applies not just to computer professionals but to all who use

computers or come into contact with their inputs and outputs which means every one living in industrialized

societies. It is this, the last part of his definition, that restricts the focus in a potentially dangerous manner as it

does not take into account the needs or impacts on the world at large simply focusing attention on the industrial

society.

Spinello [1995] explains that any technology tends to create a new human environment and never more so

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than computing. He is concerned that this new environment does not violate personal rights or the values of

fairness and justice. He insists on the inclusion of all stakeholder considerations when deciding upon

technological issues and appears to advocate a Rawlsian approach.

Miller provides some interesting input to the computer ethics debate [Collins and Miller 1992, Collins, Miller et

al 1994]. He suggests that software is different from other manufactured products and thus raises different and

difficult ethical issues. He further suggests that such issues can be addressed in a rational and systematic

manner and advocates a method for ethical decision making that is computing-specific. Without doubt there is

an implicit uniqueness claim in these suggestions.

It can be seen from this brief review that there are many views of what computer ethics comprises. This

richness of opinion is probably due to a difference in perception of computing characteristics, the adopted

focus - broadly split between the outcome/symptom of computing or the undertaking of computing, and the

disciplinary background. Starting points are certainly different and include the properties of computer

technology, the concept of computing, the application of computing and the human value impact of computing.

The perspectives can be analyzed using several sub categories:

social - considering the computing-impact on society

professional - considering the manner of professional activity

universal activist - inclusive of communities around the globe

parochial - restricted consideration of current and future issues

ethics only - drawing only from ethics theory

multi-disciplinary - blending theory from several disciplines

These are not mutually exclusive. Using starting points and perspective categories the different stances can be

classified as shown in the following table.

Johnson

85&94 Moor Gorniak Oz Maner Bynum Huff &

Finholt Gotterbarn Anderson Spinello Miller Parker

Starting Points

Properties X X X X

Concepts X

Applications X X X X X X X

Environment X

Value X

Perspectives

Social X X X X X X

Professional X X X X X

Universal X X X X

Parochial X

Ethics X X X X X X

Multi-disciplinary X X X X X X

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So from this we can determine that, for example, Moor adopts a universal conceptual multi-disciplinary stance,

Gorniak adopts an environmental universal ethicist stance, Maner is a properties ethicist and so on. What does

this mean regarding the uniqueness claim? Those that have a very strong emphasis on the technological makeup

are likely to see computing as unique [for example, Maner and to a lesser extent Oz]. Those adopting a

universal stance are more likely to subscribe to elements of uniqueness [for example, Bynum, Gorniak and

Moor]. Those who have strong application elements in their stance are more likely to question the wholly

unique position [for example, Johnson, Huff & Finholt and Gotterbarn].

In the context of this paper, it is interesting to analyze to what purpose these particular stances have been put.

It is clear that the all the authors reviewed in this paper have argued a particular stance to explain why and how

certain situations and decisions have occurred and to give some insight to the future. It is also clear that these

stances have then been used to substantiate the importance of a particular direction of computer ethics or

justify some holistic label for computer ethics. The table below shows, for each author, the main thrust with

respect to uniqueness and the underlying message as to the nature of computer ethics that the uniqueness

stance has been used to justify and promote. For example, Johnson's genus-species stance is the justification

for using existing theory for computer ethics in other words the "use the old order" holistic label. In contrast,

Miller's assertion of software as a different product is the justification for a special approach called computer

ethics. Bynum's stance of computing being all pervasive is used to argue that computer ethics is about the

human values and technology equation whilst pervasiveness is used by Anderson to promote the idea that

computer ethics is important for all people in a technologically-dependent world.

Author Overall thrust regarding uniqueness Computer ethics message

Johnson genus-species use the older order

Maner special technology bounded and worthy of study

Gotterbarn professional specificity codes and other guides are essential

Miller different product need for special approach

Moor vacuum need for serious multi-disciplinary consideration

Oz special technology special discipline

Bynum all pervasive human value to computer equation

Anderson all pervasive computer ethics for all

Gorniak all pervasive global new order

Spinello special technology inclusion of all interests and concerns

Huff and Finholt all pervasive inclusive approach

Parker non consensus no new discipline

4 A Range of Views

The evidence for the whole panorama of uniqueness claims is drawn either from some special characteristic

about the computer or from the type and pervasiveness of the impact on social institutions. When the machine

is used as evidence, its novel characteristics are referenced, for example, logical malleability [Moor 1985], or

information storage [Maner 1996]. The machine is unique if some parts of it which are unique can be

identified. The appeal to social phenomena is not as absolute as the appeal to the machine. It is in the type

and range of social phenomena used in the uniqueness claim that we also find evidence for the amorphous

nature of CEIU.

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The views on the scope of the impact of computers on social institutions ranges from the universal to the very

narrow. Both Moor and Gorniak start from the claim that the impact of the computer is pervasive, on all

aspects of society, yet one concludes that we need to apply ethics to the policy vacuums created by this

machine while the other questions the applicability of traditional ethics to global ethics. Terry Bynum follows

Moor on the pervasiveness question, but Bynum wants computer ethics to advance and protect human values.

This is an evolutionary view. Others argue that the range of impact is limited and their view of computer ethics

is in part determined by what they include in the range of unique impact. Gotterbarn [1992] argued for a very

narrow range of unique situations, namely those situations which are relevant to the practising professional and

he claimed that all other ethical situations have analogies to traditional ethical issues. The unique professional

issues could be addressed using principles of John Rawls. In her first book, Deborah Johnson [1985] simply

addressed a set of issues which had "a different moral flavor" but could all be managed by traditional moral

principles. In a later piece with Miller[1996], there are clear indications that some of the transformed situations

cannot be addressed using traditional normative concepts. Collins and Miller [1992] also used Rawlsian

techniques, but they applied them to a much broader range of situations than did Gotterbarn. Effy Oz, limits

the scope of ethical issues to computer abuses and uses traditional normative theories to address these issues.

In the brief period of time that computer ethics has been discussed, the truth of Moor's insight about the

increasing pervasiveness of computing and the need to address new issues is quite evident. As the technology

called computing has worked its ways into new facets of life, the scope of computer ethics has changed. One

of the things this investigation has revealed is that several of the authors have broadened the range of situations

that they subsume under computer ethics. These elements are unique in the sense that they are new elements in

the human situation. However, they are still part of the human situation which can be understood in terms of

traditional ethics. It is these authors who have been at the forefront of evolutionary ethics.

The arguments in support of revolutionary computer ethics have not been very convincing. For example,

Gorniak argues that Kantianism is not relevant to global ethics, "because Kantianism developed in the West,

and computer ethics is global, Kantianism is not applicable". She extends this claim to all moral theories

developed in the West. . She argues that they are not global because they are not universally accepted,

respected, and followed. Gorniak rejects the applicability of a moral principle based on its failure to be a

"universally accepted ethical system". . Maner's arguments are equally unconvincing. He moves from claiming

the uniqueness of a select group of moral situations to claiming that we must discover new moral principles;

but he has not demonstrated that the ways in which these situations are unique entails the irrelevancy of

traditional moral norms to these situations.

5 Conclusion

The claim that computer ethics is unique is correct in only a limited sense. It is correct that some of the

particular decisions in computer ethics are unique but the revolutionary view that the methods and fundamental

principles of ethics are unique has not been demonstrated. We have seen that several situations are so

transformed by the computer that they are unique. There have been a variety of answers as to the scope of the

unique situations: all social interactions that are transformed by a computer, cases of computer abuse, or issues

related to software development. If the domain of computer ethics is defined by those elements which are

unique, we first need to understand the sense of uniqueness we are talking about when dealing with computer

ethics.

Those who study views of various computer ethicists are often misled by the simple claim that "Computer

ethics is unique." To avoid the continuation of these difficulties it is necessary for those who assert this claim to

clearly define their concepts using the categories we have defined above. To paraphrase James, "If we clearly

state the elements of our standards of the uniqueness we can spend less time arguing for the uniqueness of

computer ethics and more energy doing computer ethics."

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publication details

GOTTERBARN, D., ROGERSON, S., Computer Ethics: The Evolution of the Uniqueness Revolution, the

ACM Computer Ethics Conference CEPE'97, Erasmus University, The Netherlands, 1997.

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... According to Gotterbarn and Rogerson (1998), both Moor (1985) and Gorniak (1996) demanded that the impact of the computer is pervasive in all aspects of society. While Moor (1985) concluded that people need to apply ethics to the policy vacuums created by computers, Gorniak questioned the applicability of traditional ethics to global ethics (Gotterbarn & Rogerson, 1998). ...

This study examined the effectiveness of an electronic performance support system (EPSS) on computer ethics education and the ethical decision-making processes. There were five different phases to this ten month study: (1) Writing computer ethics scenarios, (2) Designing a decision-making framework (3) Developing EPSS software (4) Using EPSS in a case-based computer ethics education process (5) Analyzing all of the data collected from the implementation. A total of 15 computer ethics scenarios were written by the researchers and revised in accordance with the opinions of 12 experts from different universities. Barger's (2008) ethical decision-making model was adapted to a flow chart for generating a decision-making framework for the system. Quantitative and qualitative research methods, multivariate analysis of variance and semi-structured interviews were used together to investigate the effectiveness of the system. The results showed that the EPSS that was developed improved the decision-making skills of the students in the experimental group who were faced with different computer ethics scenarios during the implementation of the study. To present a balanced view both positive and negative comments made by the students regarding the EPSS were recorded and are presented in the study.

... Ethics in SE has started gaining more attention. Initial discussions [59] focus on professional ethics which later lead to IEEE/ACM code of conduct for SE. However, with the rapid integration of software in the lives of individuals as well as in the processes of organizations, software artifacts and software development processes are subject to more numerous and more heterogeneous ethical concerns than professional ethics alone. ...

Today's software is highly intertwined with our lives, and it possesses an increasing ability to act and influence us. Besides the renown example of self-driving cars and their potential harmfulness, more mundane software such as social networks can introduce bias, break privacy preferences, lead to digital addiction, etc. Additionally, the software engineering (SE) process itself is highly affected by ethical issues, such as diversity and business ethics. This paper introduces ethics-aware SE, a version of SE in which the ethical values of the stakeholders (including developers and users) are captured, analyzed, and reflected in software specifications and in the SE processes. We propose an analytical framework that assists stakeholders in analyzing ethical issues in terms of subject (software artifact or SE process), relevant value (diversity, privacy, autonomy, ...), and threatened object (user, developer, ...). We also define a roadmap that illustrates the necessary steps for the SE research and practice community in order to fully realize ethics-aware SE.

... We agree with Gotternbarn and Rogerson [16] in that "computer ethics is unique is correct in only a limited sense. It is correct that some of the particular dicisions in computer ethics are unique but the revolutionary view that the methods and fundamental priciples of ethics are unique has not been demonstrated". ...

Teaching Ethics at Engineering and Computer Science at the European Universities is a essential for two reasons: we want students to do their job well as a service to the society, and more and more professional associations require it as part of their accreditation as a computer scientist (IEEE-CS, ACM). In this paper we are going to explain several topics: 1) the syllabus and methodology that we propose for a Computer Ethics course of 30 hours in the last course of an undergraduate degree; 2) the detailed content of the proposed syllabus; 3) the Computer Ethics resources that the teachers may use to prepare this course. We conclude that a Computer Ethics course must be put in place in all European universities and that we have the resources to do it now.

Yvonne Ying-Ya Wen
Gavin Thomson

Without the steering wheel of an appropriate moral code, knowledge can become a blindfold driver that takes the whole human race to self-destruction. In our time, we are supplied with all sorts of Information and Computer Technologies but not teachings on netiquette or cyber law. We are playing like children, light-heartedly and dangerously, with the marvelously powerful " infosphere " long before we learn how to behave as civilized citizens in the information society. Cyber crime is so pervasive that hardly any computer, as long as it is connected to the Internet, can be absolutely free from the invasion of illegal online activities. Web-based information and communications technologies are now seen as a means for facilitating antisocial criminal activities which undermine social security. E-education can prevent cyber crime from becoming unbearably overwhelming. Faced with such a moral chaos in cyber space, e-education can not exclude cyber literacy and ethics from its curricula. Just like putting out a fire before it grows out of control, cyber literacy and ethics can help make a difference if we take it seriously in early e-education. This paper proposes English for Specific Purposes as a means to enhance students' cyber literacy and ethics. When cyber literacy and ethnics are linked with students' translation assignments, students are motivated in the learning process and the course content is meaningful to students. The result of this pedagogy is a multi-layered learning structure.

Herman T. Tavani

The purpose of this essay is to determine what exactly is meant by the claim computer ethics is unique, a position that will henceforth be referred to as the CEIU thesis. A brief sketch of the CEIU debate is provided, and an empirical case involving a recent incident of cyberstalking is briefly considered in order to illustrate some controversial points of contention in that debate. To gain a clearer understanding of what exactly is asserted in the various claims about the uniqueness of computer ethics, and to avoid many of the confusions currently associated with the term ``unique'', a precise definition of that term is proposed. We then differentiate two distinct and radically different interpretations of the CEIU thesis, based on arguments that can be found in the relevant computer ethics literature. The two interpretations are critically analyzed and both are shown to be inadequate in establishing the CEIU thesis. We then examine and reject two assumptions implicit in arguments advanced both by CEIU advocates and their opponents. In exposing and rejecting these assumptions, we see why it is not necessary to accept the conclusions reached by either side in this debate. Finally, we defend the view that computer ethics issues are both philosophically interesting and deserving of our attention, regardless of whether those issues might also happen to be unique ethical issues.

Herman T. Tavani

The present article focuses upon three aspects of computer ethics as a philosophical field: contemporary perspectives, future projections, and current resources. Several topics are covered, including various computer ethics methodologies, the `uniqueness' of computer ethics questions, and speculations about the impact of globalization and the internet. Also examined is the suggestion that computer ethics may `disappear' in the future. Finally, there is a brief description of computer ethics resources, such as journals, textbooks, conferences and associations.

D.G. Johnson

Shaping social behavior online takes more than new laws and modified edicts.

Effy Oz

From the Publisher:Ethics for the Information Age opens with a review of ethical theories from the ancient world to the present and covers the social impact of information,technology,computer crime,privacy issues,and computer laws in the United States and other countries. The book also covers ethical codes of professional organizations and computer ethics in higher education and the workplace. Another section discusses software as intellectual property,as a product,and as a service. Ethics for the Information Age helps students take a look into future computer-related ethical issues. This text contains plenty of real-world examples that will keep classroom discussions alive

Krystyna Gorniak-Kocikowska

The author agrees with James Moor that computer technology, because it is 'logically malleable', is bringing about a genuine social revolution. Moor compares the computer revolution to the 'industrial revolution' of the late 18th and the 19th centuries; but it is argued here that a better comparison is with the 'printing press revolution' that occurred two centuries before that. Just as the major ethical theories of Bentham and Kant were developed in response to the printing press revolution, so a new ethical theory is likely to emerge from computer ethics in response to the computer revolution. The newly emerging field of information ethics, therefore, is much more important than even its founders and advocates believe.

Walter Maner

A distinction is made between moral indoctrination and instruction in ethics. It is argued that the legitimate and important field of computer ethics should not be permitted to become mere moral indoctrination. Computer ethics is an academic field in its own right with unique ethical issues that would not have existed if computer technology had not been invented. Several example issues are presented to illustrate this point. The failure to find satisfactory non-computer analogies testifies to the uniqueness of computer ethics. Lack of an effective analogy forces us to discover new moral values, formulate new moral principles, develop new policies, and find new ways to think about the issues presented to us. For all of these reasons, the kind of issues presented deserve to be addressed separately from others that might at first appear similar. At the very least, they have been so transformed by computing technology that their altered form demands special attention.

W. R. Collins
Keith Willam Miller

Most computer professionals know that difficult ethical issues may arise in their work. We believe that these professionals want to "do the right thing." They accept their responsibilities as moral agents and they recognize that their special technical skills give them power and responsibilities. However, the will to act ethically is not sufficient; computer professionals also need skills to arrive at reasonable, ethical decisions. In this article we suggest a set of guidelines to help computer professionals consider the ethical dimensions of technical decisions and offer practical advice to individuals who need to make timely decisions in an ethical manner. We call our guidelines a paramedic method to suggest a medical analogy. We use our method on two realistic ethical dilemmas facing computer professionals. We gather and analyze the data and reach conclusions much as the principals in our cases might. Our paramedic method is not a replacement for considered analysis by professional ethicists. It is a method by which computer professionals can quickly organize and view the facts of an ethical dilemma in a systematic and practical fashion.

Source: https://www.researchgate.net/publication/313860829_Computer_Ethics_The_Evolution_of_the_Uniqueness_Revolution

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